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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
S'l1ATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent
Case

vs

No.
12751

BYRON SHULTZ
Defendant and Appellant

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Comes now the appellant in the above entitled
cause and respectfully petitions this Honorable Court
for a rehearing in this cause for the reasons and upon
the grounds as follows:

I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
APPELLANT'S REiQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 9, AND THIS COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION
OBTAINED.
IL
THE TRIAL COURT ERREID IN REFUSING
APPELLAN'r'S REQUESTED JURY IN8TRUCTION NO. 11, AND THI'8 COURT

ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION
OBTAINEID.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays for a rehearing in
this cause, that the matter be set for further argument
and that upon such rehearing th eCourt vacate its decision on file herein and for such other relief as is just.
RICHARD W. CAMPBELL
Attorney for Defendant
and Appellant
2324 Adams Avenue
Ogden, Utah
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
REHEARING
The brief of Appellant previously filed in this
case presented four points on appeal. The decision dealt
with one of those points, whether entrapment as a
matter of law was established at trial. Appellant does
not reargue that point, or Point No. 3, that Appellant
was entitled to a directed verdict on the basis of agency.
The heart of the appeal and this petition is found in
Appellant's requested Instruction No. 9 (agency) and
No. 11 (reasonable eause). These were points 2 and 4
on appeal and neither point was considered or ruled
upon in the decision.
The majority opinion cites 77-42-1, U.C.A. 1953,
to the effect that errors not affecting substantial rights
of parties should be ignored. State v Seymour 18 U.2
153, 417 P. 2d 655 was mentioned. Seymour states:
"There should be no dismissal of a charge, nor
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reversal of a judgment, unless there was a significant failure or abuse of due process of law,
or unless there was an error or defect which it
could reasonably be supposed put the defendant
at some substantial disadvantage, or had some
siibstantial prejudicial effect upon his rights."
(Emphasis added)
Appellant's requested Instruction No. 9 (set out in
Justice Henroid's dissent) forms the basis for a logical,
reasonable defense to this charge. Yet counsel could
not argue this defense because the trial court refused
the request and charged the jury:
"All persons concerned in the commission of a
crime who either directly and actively commit
the act constituting the offense or who knowingly
and with criminal intent aid and a:bet in its commission or, whether present or not, who advise and
encourage its commission, are regarded by the
law as principles in the crime thus committed and
are equally guilty thereof."
Under that instruction, the agency question was
taken from the jury as a matter of law. Did this ruling
have "some substantial prejudicial effect" upon appellant? Byron Shultz has now been in the State prison for
over six months, the beginning of a five to life pronouncement under a statute since repealed. Would he
have been acquitted if requested instruction 9 had been
given? Can this court say no as a matter of law?
The consequences of the admitted act, under Judge
W ahlquist's instructions, and under request No. 9 are
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poles apart. Without the request, no agency argument
was even possible. With it, the jury had a reasonable,
substantial basis for acquittal. Yet this Court did not
even rule upon the issue, other than by reference to
a procedural statute.
The question of "some substantial prejudicial effect"
rs brought into clinical detail with request No. 11. In
substance, the request states police must have "reasonable grounds" to suspect a person of trafficing in drugs
before they can entrap him. This position has impeccable support, set out in appellant's brief and not challenged by the State other than by citing one obscure
Federal District Court ruling.
Despite this, the opinion rendered May 4th in this
case ignores the existence of the request, the trial court's
ruling, and the prejudicial effect.
To briefly restate matters set out in our earlier
brief:
The evidence was minimal, taking less than one day,
the sale undisputed. Yet the jury took nearly 5 hours
to decide the case, and two times came back without a
verdict, requesting further entrapment instructions.
Their concern was manifest:

"You mean do they have to prove he committed
the crime before you give him an opportunity to
commit a second crime?
FOREMAN OLSEN :This is it your Honor." (Transcript Page 148).
The obvious answer to this question is No. But the
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fundamental question, the one that bothered this jury
withoid any instruction was whether it was proper for
the police to entrap a beginner, just because he was
handy. Was Byron Shultz a beginner? As a matter
of law, no. As a matter of fact, he should have received
a jury verdict on the question. What would the verdict
be? Now, we do not know. But without doubt, if effective counsel were permitted to argue "reasonable
grounds", with only four blank tablets providing those
grounds, we think the result would have been different.
This affects not only Byron Shultz, but any improvident
man in the street.
The real issue is whether this Court will permit
law enforcement agencies, and their paid informers,
to indiscriminately solicit the performance of crime. If
the answer is yes, Byron Shultz has no complaint. If
the answer is other than yes, it should be defined at
this time and Shultz tried within the framework of such
definition.
CONCLUSION
Two important issues, each of which could have
changed the verdict of the jury, were not used in the
trial court's charge. Would the verdict have been different'? Appellant says yes; this is hardly controlling.
But who can say no?
Both requests, we believe, were timely, reasonable,
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proper, and essential to the defense of Byron Shultz.
A new trial should be granted with appropriate instructions on the questions of agency and reasonable grounds
of suspicion.
Respectfully submitted,
Richard W. Campbell
Attorney for Appellant
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